In
Reality, the Elected Presidency is Subordinate to Cabinet and
Parliament.
The
Singapore Elected Presidency
(EP) has a 6-year term and has veto powers over the spending of
national reserves and monetary policies as well as over the appointments of key
positions in the Civil Service, government companies and statutory boards.
A
6-member Council of
Presidential Advisers (CPA) advises the President in the exercise
of his custodial and discretionary powers. The President is obliged to consult
the Council in the exercise of his discretionary veto powers in matters such as
the Government’s budgets and key appointments. If the Council agree with the
President’s veto, then the veto is final and Parliament must comply. If the
Council disagree, the President can still use his veto, but Parliament can
override the veto with a two-thirds majority. In other matters, such
consultation is optional.
In
many ways, the current Constitutional
framework does not give due cognizance to the fact that the President
is popularly elected and enjoys such moral weight and electoral authority that
is implied from popular election.
This
Post highlights the practical reality of the Elected Presidency as a separate,
unaccountable and unequal “branch” of the political governance structure of
Singapore.
The
Constitution expressly and deliberately subordinates the Presidency to
Parliament even though its s23(1) has first pronounced
that “the executive authority of Singapore shall be vested in the
President”. The Constitution then proceeds to dilute the same “executive
authority” by distributing its exercise jointly among the
President, the Cabinet or any Minister authorised by the Cabinet.
The
Constitution [s24(2)] further explicitly vests the executive power to run the Government in
the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, who “shall have the general direction and
control of the Government and shall be collectively responsible to Parliament”.
Elsewhere,
the Constitution also empowers Parliament ie the Cabinet and Members of
Parliament (MPs), but
not the President,
to “enact laws conferring executive functions on other persons”, and the
President is mandated to give his assent as long as such laws did not interfere
with his discretionary powers [s22H(4)].
The
Elected President does not have any law-making powers.
In other words, the Constitution did not provide the EP with any tool or “tooth”
for the execution of his Constitutional “executive authority”, the bulk of which
were “separated” and delegated or assigned by the Constitution
to the Prime Minister (and his Cabinet). And in their exercise of such
executive powers supposedly vested in the Presidency by the Constitution
[s23(1)], the Prime Minister and his Cabinet is accountable to
Parliament, not the Presidency.
In
further clear and unambiguous language, the Constitution in s21(1) pronounces
that the President shall, "in the exercise of his functions under this
Constitution or any other written law, act
in accordance
with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general
authority of the Cabinet". The President
cannot behave or act unilaterally without Cabinet’s
approval.
This
“distribution” of executive powers by the Constitution among the Elected
President, Parliament and the Prime Minister (and his Cabinet) impacts the
efficacy of the Presidency by confusing their separation of powers and
frustrates the EP’s critical role as the national reserve watchdog vis-a-vis
government’s financial prudence and possible indiscretion. In fact, many of the EP’s powers, and its decisions
even on critical discretionary matters are not absolute and can be “overruled”
by a two-third majority vote in Parliament acting in accordance with
Constitutional provisions.
The
popular election of the President was meant to imbue the Office with moral
weight and democratic electoral authority for the exercise of its functions,
especially on matters relating to past reserves and the appointment/removal of
key office holders. This is however misconceived and an exaggerated expectation
of democratic elections.
The
Elected President may be popularly elected, but it is not a “democratic”
institution by any measure since nothing in the
Constitution requires the EP to be responsible and accountable to
the electorate.
There is also no key performance indicator (KPI) to assess the EP performance
during his tenure.
This further confirms the lack of executive function and authority in the
EP.
Unlike
MPs, as well as the Prime Minister (and his Cabinet) who must regularly renew
their electoral mandate, the Elected President faces no such prospects even
though there is nothing in the Constitution preventing the EP from being elected
again, as indeed President SR Nathan.
To
what extent therefore is the Elected President “accountable” to his
electorate?
Answer:
The
Elected President is NOT accountable to the
electorate.
To
the extent “approved” by the Prime Minister (and his Cabinet), the EP can
publish in the Official Gazette his opinion and the case for his support or veto
of the Government’s request to use the national reserves. No provision exists
in the Constitution for the EP to engage in public communication or debates in
order to allow questioning and probing by the electorate regarding his opinion
to agree or his grounds for veto, whichever the case may be. It is clearly
not the intention of the Constitution for the Elected President to be an
alternate political power centre to that of the duly-elected Government.
The
Singapore Elected Presidency, with its Constitutionally-vested “executive
powers” tremendously diluted by the very same Constitution, is a separate and
unequal branch of the political governance structure. Constitutionally, it is
also not accountable to its own electoral constituency.
Having
“consulted” his CPA, should the Presidential use of veto power be
absolute?
There is no constitutional provision for the President to obtain a second
opinion outside the CPA. The Constitution creates an anomalous and ironic
incongruity by requiring an Elected President to accept the opinion of his
unelected members of his CPA; but where they disagreed to his veto, the Elected
President could very well face a two-third Parliamentary veto overturn.
Should
a veto by the Elected President in his discretionary decisions be challenged and
over-ruled by Parliament?
Or
only by a National Referendum?
A
simpler mechanism is to bypass the need for Presidential approval for the
spending from national reserves if, and only if, two-thirds of Parliament has
already approved the expenditure.
Separate,
unaccountable and unequal, whither the future of Singapore Elected
Presidency?
A
“big picture” perspective is necessary to remove the anomalies in the Elected
Presidency innovation. The EP remains very much a work-in-progress in
Singapore’s political governance landscape. A custodial Presidential
oversight responsibility over sovereign reserves and appointment of senior
public officials does not necessarily confer any viable executive authority onto
the Elected President.
The
current review of the Elected Presidency should examine all the constitutional
provisions relating to the EP, Cabinet and Parliament. To avoid ambiguities with
regard to who has final and ultimate executive authority would require expressed
and explicit statements to the effect. In a
democracy, it is the Cabinet, supported by Parliament, who has true electoral
mandate and therefore the ultimate executive authority to be responsible and
accountable to the electorate.